Saying things you don't believe: A scientific virtue

In the course of scientific debates and discussions, I often say and claim things I don't actually believe. I may think these things have a good chance of being true, or maybe I just can't immediately think of why they're false, but I don't actually believe them the way that I believe that my lunch was tasty today or that my adviser is currently in Mexico. I may even think that what I'm saying definitely can't be right for a number of reasons that I'm already aware of, but that there is a nugget of truth in it, which can be stripped and pulled out of the whole, clarified and put forward on its own.

I think this is an activity that, outside of scientific discussions, seems pretty incomprehensible. After all, why would any sane person voluntarily debate and defend a position they're really not that sure of (or even blatantly know is wrong) just for fun? Is that person just being contrary? Arrogant?

But I think that when it comes to the deeper questions -- the questions none of us really know the answers to -- saying things we don't believe is really the only way to proceed, because it's the only way to say anything at all. Scientists would be a lot less productive if they waited until they had fully worked-out theories before proposing them to anyone, because there are enormous benefits in the discussion process itself. In many cases, saying things we don't believe is a sort of test -- if I can't think of any reason why what I'm saying is wrong, and you (a thousand yous) can't either, then maybe it's actually right. But of course, at the time I'm saying it, I'm far from sure it's right. I may even know it's wrong, but not know exactly why, or not know how to get at the one bit that seems right. Stating an idea and letting others tear it down is one way -- in my opinion, a very good one -- of getting at the truth. And that makes it, I think, a good scientific skill to have.

It's something I wish was more understood and appreciated in other domains -- in ordinary non-academic discussions of politics, religion and morality. It's especially something I wish was acknowledged by scientists themselves. Too often, I think, scientists feel the need to stand behind their claims, staking their reputations and careers not so much on the interestingness or eventual potential of their idea as on its truth in its current form. This necessarily causes ego to get involved and emotions to run high when theoretical matters are debated. It is as if the person feels that all of the rest of their ideas would cease to have value if the one at hand didn't turn out to be true, while in reality, just about everyone who has ever made an amazing discovery has had incredible amounts of false (not to mention just plain bad) ideas. Take, for example, Newton's weird theological and occult theories. Of course, there are many different reasons egos get involved in science, and a full discussion isn't necessary here (which is lucky for me, to paraphrase Jerry Fodor, because I don't have one). I think, though, that this unfortunate tendency would be curbed somewhat if scientists became more comfortable with -- and graduate students were explicitly encouraged to -- express thoughtful, well-reasoned and interesting ideas that are acknowledged to be quite probably false.